A Culture Shaped by Immigrants: Examining the Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy by White, Roger & Francis, Shane
Whittier College 
Poet Commons 
Economics Faculty Publications & Research 
2016 
A Culture Shaped by Immigrants: Examining the Consequences of 
U.S. Immigration Policy 
Roger White 
Whittier College, rwhite1@whittier.edu 
Shane Francis 
Whittier College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://poetcommons.whittier.edu/econ 
 Part of the International Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
White, Roger and Francis, Shane, "A Culture Shaped by Immigrants: Examining the Consequences of U.S. 
Immigration Policy" (2016). Economics. 36. 
https://poetcommons.whittier.edu/econ/36 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications & Research at Poet 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics by an authorized administrator of Poet Commons. For 
more information, please contact library@whittier.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter  
 
 
 
A Culture Shaped by Immigrants: Examining the 
Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy 
 
 
Roger White* 
Whittier College 
 
Shane Francis 
Whittier College 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine U.S. immigration history both by recounting the related legislative history 
and by examining data on immigrant inflows and inflow shares during the period from 
1820 through 2013. A descriptive analysis of the cultural differences between the U.S. 
and several cohorts of countries suggests that U.S. culture has been shaped by the pattern 
of immigrant arrivals. Broadly stated, American culture has evolved to be similar to those 
of European societies (predominantly, countries in Northern and Western Europe) and to 
largely be dissimilar to the cultures of other regions. Following the enactment of the 
Hart-Celler Act in 1968, the primary source regions of U.S. immigrant arrivals shifted to 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, and (to a lesser degree) Africa. We find 
some evidence that the U.S. has become more similar to the cultures of the recent 
arrivals’ source countries. Our econometric analysis tests for structural breaks in the level 
of the immigrant inflow and inflow share series. The results support our general findings. 
We find clear evidence of significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and in the 
immigrant inflow share series. The detected structural breaks correspond with key pieces 
of legislation that have significantly influenced U.S. immigration policy. 
 
Keywords: Cultural Distance, Generalized Least Squares, Hart-Celler Act, Immigration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents an exploration of sorts. The cultural evolution of the United States 
is intricately tied to its immigration history, a history that has been influenced by the 
country’s immigration policies. Prior to 1790, during the Colonial Era and the first years 
following independence, an “open door” policy was largely maintained. From 1790 until 
1875, the U.S. followed a de facto immigration policy linked to the laws that governed 
naturalization. Specifically, no laws restricted the arrival of immigrants or dictated the 
composition of inflows, but immigration to the U.S. was shaped by restrictions on who could 
become a citizen. This provided incentives for immigration from Northern and Western 
Europe while serving to discourage migration from other regions. Beginning in 1875, de jure 
federal legislation/policies shaped immigration to the U.S. The policies afforded entry 
preference to immigrants from Europe and directly limited or, in some cases, indirectly 
discouraged immigration from many other locales. This persisted, largely, until the Hart-
Celler Act was enacted in 1968. The Act led to a marked increase in the annual immigrant 
inflow as well as a corresponding shift in the primary source regions for U.S. immigrant 
arrivals. 
To a large degree, the current composition of American society, as indicated by self-
reported ancestries, mirrors the historic immigrant inflows of the country.
1
 From 1840 
through 1889, 14.3 million immigrants arrived to the United States. Europe was the primary 
source region of these arrivals, accounting for 12.8 million immigrants (89.1% of the total 
inflow). More specifically, 11.7 million of the arrivals were from Northern and Western 
European countries with Germany (29.9% of the total inflow), Ireland (22.4%), and the 
United Kingdom (18.1%) collectively accounting for 10.1 million arrivals. Between 1890 and 
1919, another 18.2 million immigrants arrived. Of the arrivals during this period, 88.4 percent 
were from Europe and another 4.6 percent were from Canada. Unlike earlier inflows, 
however, the primary source regions were Southern and Eastern Europe with Italy (20.6%), 
Austria-Hungary (20.2%), and Russia and Poland (17.4%) accounting for 10.6 million of the 
total inflow. Even so, as of 1919, the U.S. population was predominantly European or of 
European descent.  
Following several decades of diminished immigrant inflows, U.S. immigration policy 
changed when the Hart-Celler Act (i.e., the Immigration Act of 1965) was enacted. The Act 
abolished the biased National Origins Formula that had been in place since passage of the 
Emergency Quota Act in 1921 and established a preference system based on family 
reunification, filling labor market vacancies, and admission of refugees and asylum-seekers. 
When the Hart-Celler Act was implemented, a resulting shift occurred in the primary source 
regions of U.S. immigrants. No longer was Europe the primary source region. It had been 
replaced by Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and, to a lesser extent, Africa. Even so, 
over the 2009-2013 period, the American Community Study (ACS) found that 58 percent of 
the U.S.’s residents self-identified as being of European ancestry (ACS, 2015).  
During the past 50 years, a total of 58.5 million immigrants entered the United States. 
Illustrative of the pronounced shift in source regions, Europe and Canada account for only 8.1 
million of the total immigrant inflow (13.8%). The vast majority of these more recent 
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immigrant arrivals have come from Latin America (50.8%) or Southern and Eastern Asia 
(25.2%). The primary source countries have been Mexico (with 27.8% of the total inflow), 
China (5.4%), and India (4.6%). These three countries have collectively accounted for 22.2 
million of the total immigrant arrivals. 
Generally speaking, this chapter details our exploration of the history of immigration to 
the United States. We look at the related legislative history and at data on immigrant inflows 
for the period from 1820-2013. We augment our review of immigration policy with a 
descriptive analysis of the cultural differences between the U.S. and several cohorts of 
countries. The aim is to determine whether U.S. immigration policy and the corresponding 
level of immigrant inflows and composition of inflows by country/region have influenced 
American culture. We support our descriptive analysis with an economteric analysis of 
immigrant inflows where we test for structural breaks in the level of immigrant inflows and in 
the composition of the inflow share series.  
We find that U.S. immigration policy has had a marked influence on immigrant arrivals 
both in terms of the number of arrivals and their source countries/regions. Further, the 
immigrant arrivals have influenced American culture such that the U.S. was, in the late 1960s, 
more culturally-similar to Europe (particularly Northern and Western European countries), 
Canada, and Australia and New Zealand and dissimilar to the cultures of Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and Africa. However, there is some evidence that the shift in source 
countries and regions of U.S. immigrant arrivals that followed the enactment of the Hart-
Celler Act has moved the culture of the U.S. closer to the cultures of recent immigrant 
arrivals’ source countries and, thus, somewhat away from what may be described as more 
traditional source countries. Supporting these findings, our econometric analysis provides 
clear evidence of significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and the immigrant inflow 
share series that correspond with key pieces of legislation that has governed U.S. immigration 
policy.  
In the next section, we review U.S. immigration policy. This is followed by the 
introduction of two composite measures of cross-societal cultural differences (i.e., cultural 
distance) and a descriptive examination of the measures. We then present the findings from 
an econometric analysis that tests for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow and immigrant 
inflow share series before concluding. 
 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION HISTORY 
 
From the founding of the Virginia Colony at Jamestown in 1607 through the passage of 
the Page Act in 1875, no laws restricted the inflow of individuals to what is now the United 
States. Instead, a quasi-open door policy existed. Even though there were no restrictions on 
who may enter the country, restrictions did limit who could become a citizen. This likely 
influenced both the level of immigrant inflows during the period and the composition of 
inflows in terms of source countries and regions. More specifically, the Naturalization Act of 
1790 established a uniform citizenship process. It allowed “any alien, being a free white 
person” and “of good moral character” who had lived in the country for two or more years to 
become a U.S. citizen (Jaggers, et al., 2013). The Naturalization Act of 1795 increased the 
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residency requirement to five years, and the Naturalization Act of 1798 extended the required 
residency period further to 14 years (Orgad, 2011).
2
   
The combination of the U.S. having been a British colony and the stipulation that 
citizenship was only attainable for white residents in all likelihood encouraged emigration 
from Northern and Western European countries while discouraging emigration from other 
locales. Evidence supporting this assertion is found in the 1790 U.S. census. Nearly two-
thirds (66.2%) of the population was either English or of English descent.
3
 Another 14.2 
percent of the population was Scotch (5.6%), German (4.5%), Dutch (2.0%), Irish (1.6%), 
French (0.5%), or descendants of immigrants from these countries. Yet another 0.27 percent 
of the population was classified as white but of unknown origin. Slaves, primarily from West 
Africa, constituted 17.8 percent of the population, and free non-whites accounted for 1.3 
percent of the population. Native Americans (i.e., the indigenous peoples) comprised only 
0.19 percent of the population.  
More than 80 percent of the total U.S. population in 1790, and 97.8 percent of the 
country’s free population, was either an immigrant from Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, or France or was a descendant of someone from these countries. This allowed 
for a massive cultural transfer from Northern and Western European countries to the 
American colonies and, thus, to the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau, 1909). This cultural transfer 
was part of the Columbian Exchange which included biological exchange (e.g., animals, 
plants, technology, diseases, etc.) between the New and Old Worlds (Crosby, 1972).  
The profoundly unequal “exchange” favored the Europeans and was detrimental to the 
indigenous peoples of the Americas. The arrival of the Spanish, the French, and the British 
led to the decimation of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Dutch, Swedish, and even 
Russian immigrants (primarily along the Pacific Coast) also contributed to the demise of the 
Native Americans. By 1790, only a few thousand Native Americans lived east of the 
Alleghany Mountains and only in Pennsylvania and New York, where reservations had been 
established, and beyond the western frontier settlements were the numbers of Native 
Americans sufficient for the maintenance of tribal relations and the occupation of 
considerable territory (U.S. Census Bureau, 1909). 
 
Naturalization Laws and De Facto Federal Immigration Policy 
 
Prior to the passage of the Steerage Act in 1819 no records were kept of the number of 
immigrant arrivals to the U.S. or the immigrants’ countries of origin. The Steerage Act, 
however, required shipmasters to provide manifests with counts of all immigrants transported. 
These numbers were tracked by the Secretary of State and reported to the Congress (Koven 
and Götzke, 2010). Another quarter-century would pass until additional legislation governing 
immigration was enacted. The Passenger Law of 1847 and the Passenger Law of 1855 
regulated the transport of immigrants to the United States. For example, the 1855 law 
required no more than one passenger for every two tons of the vessel, a minimum amount of 
deck space (16 feet) per passenger, and that ships were subject to inspection upon arrival at 
U.S. ports and captains would be fined for any violations (Hirota, 2013). While these laws 
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provided for a safer and more comfortable passage to the U.S., they were not aimed at 
limiting the number of arrivals, so the laws did little to affect the source country composition 
of immigrant inflows. In fact, Table 1 shows that 90 percent of the 9,985,008 immigrants that 
entered the U.S. between 1820 and 1881 were from European countries. The vast majority 
(87.3%) of these immigrants were from Northern Europe (primarily, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and Scandinavia) or Western Europe (Germany).  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
The first laws enacted with the goal of restricting immigration to the U.S. were passed by 
the California state legislature. In 1850 and in 1852, the legislature imposed taxes on foreign 
miners. The 1850 law required foreign miners to pay a monthly tax of $20; however, the law 
proved so unpopular that it was repealed in 1851 and replaced in 1852 by a monthly tax of $4 
(OAC, 2016). A subsequent piece of legislation that was also passed by the California 
legislature was known as the “Anti-coolie law”. The formal title of this law is “An Act to 
Protect Free White Labor against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor and to Discourage 
the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California” (Haymond, et al., 1873). The Act 
imposed a $2.50 tax on anyone of Chinese origin who applied for a mining and/or business 
license (Lee, 2015a). By raising the cost of working in the U.S. and by discriminating in 
terms of which individuals were subject to the taxes, the legislature was seeking to both limit 
the number of immigrant arrivals, especially those arriving from China, and alter the 
composition of the foreign-born population. 
Efforts to limit immigration at the Federal level lagged behind those of the State of 
California and were, at times, contrary to the discriminatory laws enacted in California. For 
example, as a matter of necessity, due to shortages caused by the Civil War, the Immigration 
Act of 1864 encouraged the immigration of foreign laborers (Gold, 2012). The Naturalization 
Act of 1870 extended the right to citizenship to blacks and Native Americans; however, 
Asians (except Filipinos) remained ineligible for U.S. citizenship (Mink, 1998).  
 
Restricting Immigration: De Jure Federal Immigration Policy 
 
The Page Act of 1875 was the first piece of Federal legislation that explicitly restricted 
immigration to the United States. The Page Act banned “undesirable” individuals from entry 
to the U.S. What was considered “undesirable” included Asian women who might engage in 
prostitution, any Asian who may be used as forced labor once in the U.S., and anyone (Asian 
or otherwise) who was a convict in their home country (Miller, 2012). A similar piece of 
legislation, the Immigration Act of 1891, barred the entry of individuals who suffered from a 
dangerous contagious disease, had been convicted in their home country of a crime involving 
moral turpitude, or were polygamists (Richardson, 1962).  
Between 1876 and 1881, 1,754,826 immigrants entered the U.S.
4
 Similar to the earlier 
portion of the century, the majority (76.4%) of these immigrants was from European 
countries. Likewise, Northern and Western Europe were again the primary source regions, 
accounting for 87.8 percent of the immigrants from Europe. Figure 1 illustrates the time paths 
of immigrant inflows from Africa, the Americas (excluding Canada), Asia, and Europe, 
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Canada, and Oceania. The sub-regions and countries that were the main sources for U.S. 
immigrant arrivals were Scandinavia (31.4% of the total inflow from Europe), Ireland 
(19.4%), Germany (16%), the United Kingdom (15.3%), and other countries in Northwestern 
Europe (5.8%). Of the 578,504 non-European immigrant arrivals to the U.S. during this 
period, by far the most common source country was Canada which accounted for 326,714 
(56.5%) of the non-European inflow. An additional 69,663 immigrants arrived from China 
(12% of the non-European inflow) which was similar to the number of arrivals from Italy 
(67,987). 
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
As the California Gold Rush wound down in the mid-1850s and the transcontinental 
railroad was completed in 1869, there was a corresponding decrease in the demand for 
foreign labor. Anti-Chinese sentiment that had mostly been limited to California during the 
1850s and 1860s grew and extended to other locales. Instability of the U.S. economy 
following the close of the Civil War, coupled with high unemployment and a sluggish labor 
market during the Long Depression (1873-1879), heightened anti-Chinese sentiment as many 
in the U.S. viewed the Chinese laborers as competition for jobs. During the period, anti-
Chinese riots and violence occurred in more than 30 cities (Lee, 2015b). The Alien Contract 
Labor Law of 1885 prohibited the entry of contract labor to the U.S., with the exceptions of 
immigrants who were to perform domestic services and those who were considered skilled 
workmen that were needed to establish new trades and/or industries in the United States 
(DeLaet, 2000). Effectively, the Alien Contract Labor Law afforded considerable protection 
to domestic labor. 
The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) was the second federal law that restricted immigration 
to the U.S. and it was the first to do so in a significant way. The Act halted Chinese migration 
to the U.S. for a period of ten years and prohibited Chinese residents of the U.S. from 
becoming citizens (Chang, 2004). In 1892, the Geary Act extended the ban for an additional 
decade. The Geary Act also required all Chinese already living in the U.S. to carry permits 
(Gold, 2012). As the expiration of the Geary Act neared, in 1902 the Scott Act was passed 
which effectively renewed the Chinese Exclusion Act, this time making the ban on Chinese 
immigration permanent. Coinciding with the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Immigration Act of 
1882 sought to further restrict immigrant inflows by imposing a $0.50 arrival tax on all 
immigrants and, in the same vein as the Page Act of 1875, by making some classifications of 
immigrants ineligible for citizenship (i.e., those deemed to be “lunatics” or who were likely to 
become public charges) (Wexler, 2009). Similarly, following the assassination of President 
William McKinley in 1901 by a Polish anarchist, the Anarchist Exclusion Act, which 
prohibited the entry of anyone judged to be an anarchist or political extremist, was passed by 
Congress in 1903 (Bantman and Altena, 2015). 
The decades following the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act saw many additional 
pieces of legislation limit and/or discourage migration to the U.S. Generally, these laws 
served to limit immigration unevenly with Northern and Western European countries 
continuing to receive preferential treatment. For example, the Naturalization Act of 1906 
standardized the process for naturalization and made knowledge of the English language a 
prerequisite for citizenship (Ovando, 2003). A year later, an informal agreement (known as 
the “Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907”) was struck between the U.S. and Japan wherein the 
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U.S. government agreed to work to reduce discrimination against Japanese Americans and to 
not explicitly restrict migration from Japan if the Japanese government would voluntarily 
restrict migration to the U.S. (Uba, 2003).  
Also in 1907, the Congress established the Dillingham Commission to examine the 
effects of immigration on the United States. After four years of study, the Commission 
concluded that migration from Southern European and Eastern European countries posed a 
risk to American society and its culture (King, 2002). Accordingly, the Commission 
recommended stark reductions in inflows from these regions. Also in 1907, the Expatriation 
Act declared that any American woman who married a foreign national would lose her 
citizenship (Bredbenner, 1998). This prohibition was partially repealed by the Cable Act of 
1922; however, it remained that any American woman who married an Asian would lose her 
citizenship (Bredbenner, 1998). In 1913, the California legislature passed the Alien Land Law 
which dictated that individuals who are ineligible for citizenship cannot own property in the 
state (Bailey, 1932). Other states used this law as a model for similar anti-Asian laws.    
At the close of World War I, due to a heightened sense of nationalism and/or a perceived 
need for economic self-sufficiency, the Congress overrode a presidential veto to pass the 
Immigration Act of 1917. The Act created the “Asiatic Barred Zone”, effectively banning all 
migration to the U.S. from Asia, with the exceptions of Japan and the Philippines. Of course, 
immigration from Japan was already limited by the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907 and, at 
the time, the Philippines was a protectorate of the U.S. Even with the existing restrictions on 
the composition of immigrant inflows, efforts continued throughout the inter-war period to 
further limit the amount of immigration to the U.S.  
Collectively, the legislative restrictions imposed on immigration to the U.S. achieved the 
goal of limiting non-European migration. Revisiting Table 1, we find that immigration from 
Asia increased from the previous period but also that immigration from China to the U.S. 
decreased to zero after 1882. We also see that 89.5 percent of the 22,986,644 immigrant 
arrivals to the U.S. during the 1882-1920 period were from Europe.
5
 However, differing from 
inflows during earlier periods, Northern and Western Europe no longer were the primary 
source regions. Only 35.8 percent of the total immigrant inflow came from Northern (25.2%) 
or Western (10.6%) Europe. Instead, Southern (20.3%) and Eastern (33.2%) Europe emerged 
to account for 53.5 percent of the total inflow. Italy and Poland largely accounted for the high 
inflow shares of these sub-regions. 
The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 limited the annual immigrant inflow from any 
country to three percent of the 1910 U.S. population from that country (Hatton and 
Williamson, 2005). Only three years later, the Immigration Act of 1924 further limited annual 
migration from European nations to two percent or less of the number of people from a given 
country who lived in the U.S. in 1890 (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). By lowering the limit 
to two percent and moving the reference date to 1890, the Act greatly reduced immigration 
from Southern and Eastern Europe.  
Further restricting migration from Asia, the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 extended the 
ban on immigration from Asia to include foreign-born wives and children of American 
citizens of Chinese ancestry (Green and Stabler, 2015). This followed two landmark Supreme 
Court cases: Ozawa vs. the United States in 1922 and the United States vs. Bhaghat Singh 
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Thind in 1923. In the Ozawa case, the Court ruled that Takao Ozawa, who was of Japanese 
origin, could not become a U.S. citizen as he was not white (Odo, 2002). Similarly, in the 
Thind case, the Court ruled that Indians from the Asian subcontinent could not become U.S. 
citizens as they are not white (Odo, 2002). In 1929, the National Origins Formula completely 
barred Asian immigration and instituted a quota system that capped the total annual inflow of 
immigrants to the U.S. at 150,000 with 85 percent of the total inflow assigned to Northern 
and Western European countries (Wepman, 2008). There were, however, no limits placed on 
migration to the U.S. from countries in the western hemisphere. Five years later, in 1934, the 
Tydings-McDuffie Act promised independence to the Philippines (as of July 4, 1946) but 
stripped Filipinos of U.S. citizenship (Baum and Harris, 2009). Finally, in 1940, the Alien 
Registration Act required that all aliens over the age of 14 in the U.S. be fingerprinted and 
registered (Camayd-Freixas, 2013).     
 
A Shift in U.S. Immigration Policy 
 
Passage of the Magnuson Act in 1943 marked the beginning of a shift in U.S. 
immigration policy from the increasingly restrictive stance that was adopted beginning in 
1875 towards a more liberal, less discriminating policy. Although the Magnuson Act repealed 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the legislative change was largely symbolic since Chinese 
migration to the U.S. remained limited to 105 immigrants per year by the National Origins 
Formula (Wong, 2005). Additional relatively minor, yet meaningful changes followed the end 
of World War II. For example, the War Brides Act of 1945, the Alien Fiancées and Fiancés 
Act of 1946, and the Alien Spouses and Children Act of 1950 established procedures for the 
immigration of foreign-born spouses, fiancées or fiancés, and children of U.S. armed forces 
personnel (Boyd, 1971; Levchenko and Solheim, 2013; and Ziegler-McPherson, 2012). 
Similarly, the 1946 Chinese War Brides Act exempted Chinese wives of American citizens 
from the quota, and the Luce-Celler Act of 1946 permitted immigration from the Philippines 
and India and granted naturalization rights to Filipino-Americans and to Indian-Americans, 
who had been previously excluded. However, similar to the repeal of the Magnuson Act, the 
Luce-Celler Act was a largely symbolic gesture as immigration from both India and the 
Philippines was restricted by annual quotas of only 100 individuals (Ziegler-McPherson, 
2012). The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was enacted as a short-term measure to allow up to 
205,000 refugees to enter the United States. Priority was given to refugees from Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, whose entry was counted again the established quota (Schindlmayr, 
2003).
6
 In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act revised the 1948 Act to allow for an additional 
200,000 refugee admissions each year (Gordon, 1980).   
Similar to the Immigration Act of 1917, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (also known 
as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952) was passed by Congress even though it had 
been vetoed by the president. The McCarran-Walter Act was somewhat of a watershed 
moment in U.S. immigration history. The Act eliminated race as a barrier to immigration and 
citizenship, allowed immediate relatives of U.S. citizens to enter without numerical 
                                                                                                                                                              
5
 It is important to note that while the importation of slaves was officially banned in 1808 there was no discernable 
increase in migration from Africa to the U.S. until the mid- to late-20
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1975). 
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 Because the number of refugee arrivals exceeded the annual quota limits, the practice of “quota mortgaging” (i.e., 
borrowing from future years’ quota limits to accommodate more arrivals in the current year) became common.  
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restriction, and revised the quota allocations established by the National Origins Formula 
(Keely, 1971). Even so, the quota limits remained biased in favor of immigrants from 
Northern and Western Europe. For example, Japan's quota was increased to only 185 
immigrants each year, China’s quota remained at 105 arrivals per year, and the annual limit 
was set at 100 for all other Asian countries (Keely, 1971). In contrast, the Act maintained the 
quota for Northern and Western European countries at 85 percent of each year’s total 
immigrant inflow, with the total annual immigrant inflow set equal to one-sixth of one 
percent of the U.S. population (Keely, 1971). Additionally, restrictions on immigrants from 
British colonies were tightened while immigrants who married American women were added 
to those exempt from quotas (Keely, 1971).  
Given the strict limits placed on the level of immigrant inflows, only 6,305,238 
immigrants entered the U.S. during the 1921-1951 period (see Table 1). The annual average 
inflow of 203,395 immigrants was markedly smaller than the average inflow of 
589,401immigrants witnessed during the 1882-1920 period and much closer to the average 
annual inflow of 161,049 immigrants observed from 1820 through 1881. The composition of 
immigrant inflows, in terms of source countries and regions, was also affected by the 
legislation enacted during this period. The share of the total inflow that was from Europe 
decreased to 61 percent, but the share of the total inflow accounted for by Northern and 
Western Europe (34.6%) was only slightly lower than in the preceding period. To the 
contrary, the inflow from Southern and Eastern Europe constituted only 26.3 percent of the 
total inflow, which represents a considerable decrease from the 53.5 percent value observed 
during the 1882-1920 period. As the share of immigrants from Europe declined, we see an 
increase in the immigrant share from 2.2 percent to 12.1 percent for Latin America and the 
Caribbean that is primarily due to a near-threefold increase in migration from Mexico. We 
also see a near-doubling of the immigrant share value for Asia (from 2.8% to 5.3%). 
Following the changes made during World War II and in the decade following the war, 
the Hart-Celler Act (also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965) led to 
considerable changes in both the level of immigrant inflows to the U.S. and in the source 
countries of the immigrant arrivals. When enacted in 1968, the 1965 Act abolished the quota 
system that had been in effect since the 1920s and changed the basis for entry to a) promotion 
of family reunification, b) filling of labor market vacancies (i.e., critical skills/artistic 
excellence), and c) accommodating refugees and asylum-seekers (Lie, 1995). The Hart-Celler 
Act led to a pronounced increase in the number of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and a shift in 
the primary source countries/regions of immigrant arrivals from Europe to Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Africa to a lesser extent. The Act also established an annual 
limit of 290,000 immigrant arrivals that was split as 120,000 immigrants from the western 
hemisphere and 170,000 immigrants from the eastern hemisphere (Lie, 1995). The law was 
revised in 1978 to allow for a total of 290,000 immigrant arrivals annually regardless of 
hemisphere, and two years after that the 1980 Refugee Act removed refugees as a preference 
category and the annual ceiling was decreased to 270,000 immigrants (Caroli, 1983).  
The other significant legislative changes since the passage of the Hart-Celler Act are the 
Simpson-Mazzoli Act (also known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986) and 
the Immigration Act of 1990. The Simpson-Mazzoli Act amended the Hart-Celler Act to 
provide amnesty for many undocumented immigrants and established penalties for employers 
who hired undocumented immigrants (Fuchs, 1990). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1990 increased the annual number of immigrant arrivals to 700,000 during the years 1992-
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1994 and to 675,000 per year thereafter. It also modified the preference system adopted by 
the Hart-Celler Act to include family-based immigration visa and five types of employment-
based visas (categorized by occupation), and it created a diversity visa program which sought 
to admit immigrants from traditionally “low admittance” countries or those countries that 
were underrepresented in the U.S. population (Greenwood and Ziel, 1997). 
Other legislative changes since 1968 have largely been minor and several pieces of 
legislation have focused on members of the armed forces. For example, the Armed Forces 
Naturalization Act of 1968, the Armed Forces Immigration Adjustment Act of 1991, the 2000 
Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act, and the 2000 Bring Them Home Alive Act. Additional 
legislation has focused on policies governing the entry of refugees: the Indochina Migration 
and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 and the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act. Separate 
legislation focused on labor demand for particular types of workers. Specifically, a 1989 bill 
granted permanent resident status to non-immigrant registered nurses who had lived in U.S. 
for at least three years provided that they met established certification standards.  
During the most recent two decades, even as many have asserted that a policy change is 
needed, very few legislative changes have occurred. The most significant change may be the 
USA Patriot Act of 2001 which expanded the scope of aliens ineligible for admission to the 
U.S. or that were deportable due to terrorist activities to include any alien who a) is a 
representative of a political, social, or similar group whose political endorsement of terrorist 
acts undermines U.S. antiterrorist efforts; b) has used a position of prominence to endorse 
terrorist activity or to persuade others to support such activity in a way that undermines U.S. 
antiterrorist efforts; or c) has been associated with a terrorist organization and intends to 
engage in threatening activities while in the U.S. (Sinnar, 2003).  
The cumulative effect of the Hart-Celler Act and subsequent related legislation has been 
significant changes in the level of immigrant inflows and in the composition of immigrant 
arrivals in terms of the regions of origin. Looking to Table 1 yet again we see that the 
immigrant inflow was equal to 753,644 in the typical year during the period from 1968 
through 2013. Perhaps more striking is that 44.2 percent of all U.S. immigrant arrivals during 
the period spanning 1820 through 2013 occurred during the most recent four and a half 
decades. For the first time, we see significant increases in the number of immigrants from 
Africa (i.e., 5.4% of the total inflow since 1968). We also observe a near-doubling of Asia’s 
immigrant share, from 18.2 percent during the 1952-1967 period to 35.4 percent since 1968. 
Likewise, we see the share of the total immigrant inflow from Latin America and the 
Caribbean more than doubled from 21.4 percent to 44.5 percent. As the shares for these 
regions have increased, we have witnessed a corresponding decrease in the immigrant share 
value for Europe from 44.1 percent during the 1952-1967 period to only 12.2 percent over the 
years 1968-2013.    
Thus, from our brief review of U.S. immigration history we can see that a clear bias 
favoring immigration from European countries and, notably, Northern and Western European 
countries existed until the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1968. During the past several 
decades, we have observed a considerable shift in the source countries and regions of 
immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and a significant increase in the number of immigrants that 
enter the U.S. each year. Even so, column (f) of Table 1 indicates that the cumulative 
immigrant share for Europe over the 1820-2013 period is 50.5 percent. The next highest share 
is that of Latin America and the Caribbean (22.6%) with Asia (18.2%) slightly lower.  
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As noted at the beginning of this section, the settling and populating of the United States 
coincided, especially during the Colonial Era, with the Columbian Exchange. Along with the 
biological exchange that occurred between the Old and New Worlds, there was also a cultural 
exchange. We posit that this exchange was largely one-sided and dominated by an imprint of 
European cultures on the U.S. and its residents. The duration of the exchange, facilitated in 
part by a biased immigration policy that favored European migration to the U.S. and that 
limited, in direct and indirect ways, migration to the U.S. from many other regions, acted to 
reinforce the exchange and deepen the European cultural imprint. In short, given the shift in 
the composition of immigrant inflows to Asia, Latin American and the Caribbean, and to a 
lesser extent Africa, many recent immigrant arrivals to the U.S. have entered a country that is 
quite culturally-dissimilar from their countries of origin.  
In the next section, we introduce composite measures of cultural distance and examine 
the cultural distance between the U.S. and immigrants’ home countries. We follow this by 
estimating the determinants of migration to the U.S. and testing for structural breaks in the 
immigrant inflow and immigrant inflow share series that correspond with the enactment of 
four key pieces of legislation: a) the Chinese Exclusion Act, b) the Emergency Quota Act, c) 
the McCarren-Walter Act, and d) the Hart-Celler Act. 
 
MEASURES OF CROSS-SOCIETAL CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
 
Measuring Cross-societal Cultural Differences 
 
Given the legislative history of U.S. immigration policy and the resulting influences on 
the levels of immigrant arrivals to the country and their composition in terms of source 
regions/countries, it seems reasonable to ask whether the culture of the U.S. is more similar to 
the cultures of our cohort of traditional source countries as compared to the non-traditional 
source country cohort. Similarly, the changes in the levels and primary source countries of 
immigrants to the U.S. since the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act begs the question of 
whether the U.S. has become, in recent decades, less similar to the traditional source country 
cohort and more similar to the non-traditional cohort. 
To answer the first question, we estimate the cultural distance between the U.S. and all 
countries for which data are available during the 1967-1973 period and then conduct a series 
of t-tests of the difference in mean cultural distance values between the U.S. and those 
countries that fall within the traditional and the non-traditional source country cohorts. We 
also test whether the U.S. is significantly more (or less) similar to particular regions and 
country cohorts. Examining cultural distances for this particular period of time allows us to 
determine the relative cultural distances between the U.S. and the cohorts at just about the 
time when the Hart-Celler Act became effective. To address the second question, we repeat 
our calculations using a measure of cultural distance that is based on survey data collected 
during the early 1990s. While the use of cultural distance measures that are constructed using 
two separate data sources is less than ideal, the cultural dimensions of the two series that we 
use to estimate cultural distances are comparable.  
Before performing our tests, we first introduce the two measures of cultural distance (i.e., 
cultural differences) and detail the methodology involved in the calculation of the cultural 
distance estimates.  
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The Hofstede Measure 
 
The Hofstede measure of cultural distance was inspired by Geert Hofstede’s tenure at 
IBM’s personnel research department in 1967. Surveying the company’s 117,000 employees, 
Hofstede developed cultural profiles for each of the top 40 employing countries, later 
expanding this even further. At the time, this cross-cultural database of survey questions and 
answers served as the largest of its kind, opening the door even further for quantifiable 
measures of cultural distance. Hofstede’s measure initially included four dimensions of 
cultural distance. These dimensions measure what Hofstede describes as “anthropological 
problem areas” and provide insight to how different cultures approached each area. Over the 
following few decades, additional dimensions were added. As we are interested in quantifying 
the extents of cultural differences between the U.S. and various country groupings at/near the 
time when the Hart-Celler Act was enacted, we restrict our focus to Hofstede’s initial four 
dimensions.  
The first of the dimensions is the Power Distance Index (PDI).
7
 The PDI represents how 
well individuals within a society expect and accept unequal power structures within their 
society, both at familial and institutional levels. A higher score indicates higher proclivities 
toward accepted and unchallenged hierarchies. The second dimension is Individualism vs. 
Collectivism (IDV), which analyzes the extent to which an individual identifies as being a 
member of a group. An individual with a high IDV score maintains only loose ties and 
associations with groups outside their immediate family. An individual with a low score thus 
places more importance and focus on maintaining relationships with broader collectives, such 
as extended families or those of similar beliefs. The third dimension is Masculinity vs. 
Femininity (MAS). Masculinity is viewed as a preference for achievement, aggression, and 
material rewards for success. On the other hand, Femininity is seen as an embracement of 
modesty and concerns for life quality. Within societies that score high in Masculinity, it is 
seen that differences in gender roles are often very stark between men and women relative to 
societies with high scores in Femininity. Finally, the fourth dimension is the Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index (UAI). In this index, risk-loving and risk-averse behaviors are measured for 
individuals within each society. In Hofstede’s words, it is “a society’s tolerance for 
ambiguity,” and those with higher scores tend to prefer more rigid institutions and laws as 
well as typically believing in a universal truth or morality. 
Values for Hofstede’s four initial dimensions are available for the U.S. and 100 
countries.
8
 To calculate our measure of cultural distance, we follow the process used by 
Kogut and Singh (1988): . Here, CDij is the estimated cultural 
distance between countries i and j (with the U.S. being country j), I is the index value for the 
k
th
 cultural dimension, and V is the variance of the index of the k
th
 cultural dimension. To 
illustrate, the estimated cultural distance between the U.S. and Japan is equal to 3.1096, 
which is near the average cultural distance value of 3.0723, while the U.S.-U.K. cultural 
distance is 0.0947 and the cultural distance between the U.S. and Russia is 4.8353.  
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 The source for the descriptions of the four dimensions provided in this paragraph is Hofstede (1980). 
8
 The Hofstede dimension values of each country for which data are available are provided as Appendix A. 
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We begin with our first question: Is the culture of the U.S. more similar to the cultures of 
the traditional source country cohort as compared to the cultures of the non-traditional source 
country cohort? To answer this question, we first categorize the 100 countries for which the 
Hofstede cultural dimension values are available as belonging to the traditional source 
country cohort or to the non-traditional source country cohort. The countries that are 
categorized as part of the traditional source country include Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and all countries located in Europe with the exceptions of former members of the USSR.
9
 Due 
to limited migration from these countries prior to World War II and the break in relations 
during the Cold War, this exclusion appears appropriate.
10
  
The average cultural distances from the U.S. for the traditional source country cohort and 
the non-traditional source country cohort are 2.3715 and 3.3586, respectively. The t-test of 
the difference in mean values yields a test statistic of 3.10; thus, the difference in values is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) and the answer to our first question is, as expected, that the 
culture of the U.S. at the time when the Hart-Celler Act was enacted was more similar to that 
of the typical member of the traditional source country cohort than it was to the typical 
member of the non-traditional country cohort. In other words, the culture of the United States 
was more like the cultures of the countries that had been afforded entry preference to the U.S. 
and less like the cultures of those countries that traditionally were not among the primary 
source countries for U.S. immigrant arrivals.  
Given that for many years the primary source countries for immigrant arrivals to the U.S. 
were from Northern and Western Europe, we also perform our t-test of the difference in mean 
cultural distance values between the U.S. and Northern and Eastern European countries as 
compared to the distance between the U.S. and all other countries for which data are 
available. We find that the average cultural distance from the U.S. for the countries located in 
Northern or Western Europe was equal to 1.573, while the average cultural distance for the 
remaining countries was equal to 3.2964. The t-test of the difference in mean values yields a 
test statistic of 6.16; thus, again the difference in values is statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
At the end of the 1960s, the culture of the U.S. was more like the cultures of the primary 
source countries, which had received what may be described as generous entry preference to 
the U.S., as compared to the typical culture of the other countries for which data are available.  
U.S. immigration policy heavily influenced the source countries of immigration inflows 
and thus the ethnic and cultural composition of the U.S. both classically and contemporarily. 
As policy was often created and maintained to attract immigrants from preferred regions, U.S. 
culture shifted toward the cultures of those source countries. Several purposeful measures 
were enacted to ensure U.S. acculturation threats from non-preferred countries were avoided. 
A large part of this was a selective immigration policy, both directly with the use of racial 
quotas and immigration restrictions and indirectly through legislation dictating U.S. 
naturalization processes. However, a second component utilized to combat the ‘culture threat’ 
of non-preferred source countries were laws that limited their ability to thrive or influence. 
One example that was discussed earlier is the California laws that were created to target 
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 Countries are identified as being located in Eastern, Northern, Southern, or Western Europe by the superscripts 
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 As a check of sorts, a t-test of the differences in mean values was conducted with the former USSR members 
(identified in Appendix A with a superscript asterisk after the country’s name) included in the traditional cohort. 
The resulting test statistic was equal to 3.28, indicating a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01) in the mean 
values of the cultural distance series. 
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Chinese laborers in the mid-to-late 19th Century. The legislation levied taxes, restricted travel 
and work opportunities, and added additional barriers to starting small businesses. In the same 
year that Congress tasked the Dillingham Commission (1907) to research the threat of 
immigrant influence from Eastern and Southern Europe, the Expatriation Act was passed, 
which stripped citizenship from U.S. women who married those of Asian-descent. In a few 
words, immigration and naturalization policies were used jointly to limit the influence of non-
preferred immigrants on U.S. culture, which as a result led the U.S. to develop more 
culturally-similar to Northern and Western Europe.  
As noted, prior to the Hart-Celler Act (1965) which had abolished many of the U.S.’s 
racial immigration quotas, U.S. immigration was largely from Northern and Western Europe. 
Thus, we expect the U.S. to have low cultural distance (or to be more culturally-similar) with 
these traditional source regions. Using the Hofstede measure, we find this to be true. While 
cultures do change over time, the change is often gradual. It can be safely assumed then that 
the cultural distance between countries has stayed relatively constant over the past few 
decades. As a result, the U.S. cultural values may still reflect those of its primary source 
countries from before the recent policy shift in the 1960s. 
When we look at the specific source countries of Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Ireland, and Canada we see only minor discrepancies when compared to the United 
States. Of Hofstede’s metrics, the most homogenous is the Power Distance Index, where 
nearly all countries have values between 30 and 40 (with the exception of Ireland at 28). As 
relatively stable and established democracies, the cultures of all six countries exhibit very 
similar views toward social hierarchy. The second metric, Individualism vs. Collectivism, is 
also very similar across these six western democracies, with each scoring relatively high. The 
U.S. ranks highest in this respect. By comparison, the Masculinity vs. Femininity dimension 
has great variance. For example, looking to Sweden we see a remarkably low score of 5. The 
other countries in the cohort rank between 50 and 70. Hofstede describes Sweden as a more 
feminine society that focuses more emphasis on quality of life and societal equity of 
resources. This is not unique to Sweden, but apparent within many Scandinavian countries. 
Denmark, for instance, scores a 16. In Norway, the MAS score is 8. While the U.S. as a 
whole reflects the “Masculinity” values of Western Europe and Canada, it is worth noting that 
Scandinavian immigration concentrated in particular regions of the U.S. such as Minnesota, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota. A Hofstede measure specifically for the Midwestern U.S. 
may indicate a strong similarity to Scandinavian values. The Uncertainty Avoidance Index is 
more varied across these six countries, with Germany scoring much higher than the other five. 
This is to be expected; Eastern European countries typically showcase higher UAI scores 
signaling there is less tolerance for ambiguity. The U.S., a large recipient of historic German 
immigration, does score higher in this category. While not as risk-averse as Germany, the 
U.S. is not as risk-appreciative as the United Kingdom, Sweden, or Ireland. Conclusively, we 
find that the U.S. in the Hofstede measure is never very culturally distant from the cohort’s 
consensus and very rarely strays far from the country group average. 
 
The GLOBE Project 
 
Our second question addresses whether the U.S. has become, in recent decades, less 
similar to the traditional source country cohort and more similar to the non-traditional cohort. 
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Ideally, the Hofstede cultural dimension values would have been updated in recent years and 
we would be able to make a direct comparison to the 1967-1973 data. Unfortunately, this is 
not possible. An alternative is to use a portion of the data collected from 1991 through 1994 
as part of the GLOBE (Globe Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
Research) Project. The GLOBE Project was conceived in 1991 in an attempt to better 
measure cultural differences between transnational cohorts. The data collection involved the 
surveying of more than 17,000 middle managers in 951 organizations in 58 countries (House, 
1994).  
To generate cultural dimensions, the data collected by the GLOBE Project was used to 
generate nine “cultural competencies” which we will refer to as cultural dimensions. Of these 
nine dimensions, six are quite similar to the initial four Hofstede cultural dimensions.  So 
similar in fact that Magnussen et al. (2008) consider the GLOBE Project to be an extension of 
Hofstede’s research.
11
   
Focusing on dimensions that are most similar to Hofstede’s initial four cultural 
dimensions, the first dimension is Assertiveness (ASSERT) which House et al. (2004) defines 
as “the degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their 
relationships with others.” This dimension, along with the Gender Egalitarianism (GEND-
EGL) dimension, which is described as “the degree to which a collective minimizes gender 
inequality” (House et al., 2004), are similar to Hofstede’s Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS) 
dimension.  
A second Hofstede dimension for which there are related GLOBE dimensions is 
Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV). The corresponding GLOBE dimensions are 
Institutional Collectivism (INST-COL) and In-Group Collectivism (INGP-COL). Institutional 
Collectivism is defined as “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action” 
(House et al., 2004). In-Group Collectivism is defined as “the degree to which individuals 
express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (House et al, 
2004). 
The remaining two GLOBE cultural dimensions that are related to the Hofstede 
dimensions are Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. In fact, these two GLOBE and 
Hofstede dimensions are so closely related as to share the same names: Hofstede’s 
dimensions are referred to as the Power Distance Index (PDI) and the Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index (UAI). The GLOBE dimension of Power Distance is a measure of “the degree to which 
members of a collective expect power to be distributed equally.” (House et al., 2004). By 
comparison, Hofstede’s PDI is defined as “the degree to which the less powerful members of 
a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2001). The 
GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance dimension reflects “the extent to which a society, 
organization, or group relies on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate the 
unpredictability of future events.” (House et al., 2004) Again, for the sake of comparison, the 
Hofstede UAI is defined as “a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.” 
Addressing our second question, we follow the same steps as when we examined the 
Hofstede cultural dimensions. We first calculate the GLOBE measure of cultural distance 
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following Kogut and Singh (1988).
12
 Then we categorize the 51 countries for which the 
GLOBE Project cultural dimension values are available as belonging to the traditional source 
country cohort or to the non-traditional source country cohort. Countries that are categorized 
as part of the traditional source country cohort include Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
all countries located in Europe with the exception of Russia.
13,14
 Comparing the average 
cultural distances from the U.S. for the traditional source country cohort (0.9362) and the 
non-traditional source country cohort (1.11083) produces a test statistic of 1.11; thus, the 
difference in mean values is not statistically significant from zero. This suggests that during 
the early 1990s the cultural distance between the U.S. and the typical member of the 
traditional source country cohort was not significantly different from the cultural distance 
between the U.S. and the typical non-traditional source country.  
Before reaching the conclusion implied by our t-test, it is important to note several 
caveats. First, the comparison across time periods is not entirely valid as the country groups 
do not match perfectly. Second, due to the lack of a time-varying measure of cultural 
distance, the comparison involves using different data sets. Third, roughly a quarter-century 
had transpired between the Hofstede surveys (1967-1973) and surveys administered by the 
GLOBE Project (1991-1994) and, intuitively, that seems to be too short a period of time for 
marked changes in national cultures to occur. Thus, while we feel that data limitations render 
us unable to reach the firm conclusion implied by our test, we are willing to say that a) 
additional examination, using more and better data, is necessary to fully address this question, 
and b) it may be that due to the increase in immigrant inflows and the corresponding shifts in 
immigrant inflow shares, the culture of the U.S. has become somewhat more like that of the 
non-traditional source country cohort. Further, assuming that the composition of immigrant 
arrivals to the U.S. does not change greatly in future decades, the processes that led the 
culture of the U.S. to resemble that of the traditional source country cohort will lead the U.S. 
to become culturally-similar to the source countries of more recent (and future) immigrants 
and more dissimilar from the current cultures of European countries (especially those in 
Northern and Western Europe), Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
 
POLICY CHANGES, IMMIGRANT INFLOWS, AND  
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES  
 
Given the relationships posited in the previous sections, we undertake an econometric 
analysis to determine whether key changes in U.S. immigration policy correspond with 
significant changes in the level of immigrant inflows and/or the composition of inflows in 
terms of country/region of origin. Using annual data during the period from 1820 through 
2009, we estimate the gravity model of migration to identify the determinants of immigrant 
inflows and of immigrant shares. After estimating a series of econometric specifications, we 
test for breaks in the immigrant inflows series and the immigrant share series following 
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enactment of a) the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), b) the Emergency Quota Act (1921), c) the 
McCarran-Walter Act (1952), and d) the Hart-Celler Act (1968). More specifically, we test 
for breaks in the overall data, partitioning our subjects of analysis into cohorts of “traditional” 
(i.e., Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and non-traditional source countries, 
geographic regions (e.g., Europe and Asia) and sub-regions (e.g., Northern Europe and 
Eastern Asia), and certain select countries (i.e., Canada, China, and Mexico).
15
 The presence 
of a break in the data series indicates that the policy change had a significant effect on the 
volume and/or composition of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and, thus, may have a 
pronounced influence on U.S. culture and, hence, the cultural distance between the U.S. and 
the immigrants’ home countries.  
The gravity model of migration is a variation of the gravity model of international trade, 
which was initially developed by Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963a and 1963b), and 
Linnemann (1966).
16
 Prior applications of the gravity framework to migration flows include 
Lewer and van den Berg (2008), White and Yamasaki (2014), and White (2015). The general 
specifications of the model that we use are given as equation (1) and equation (2). 
 
 
  (1) 
 
 
  (2) 
 
In equation (1), the dependent variable series is the natural logarithm of immigrant 
inflows from country i that arrived in country j (i.e., the U.S.) during year t . 
Estimation of this equation affords an understanding of the determinants of the level of 
immigrant inflows to the U.S. during our reference period. Equation (2) is identical to 
equation (1) except that the dependent variable series is changed to the share of total U.S. 
immigrant arrivals during year t that are from country j  and the corresponding 
alteration of the first explanatory variable listed (i.e., the one-year lagged value of the 
respective dependent variable series). 
The one-year lagged values of the dependent variable series are included in each 
regression specification to capture inertia in immigrant arrivals and shares. Accordingly, we 
anticipate that the corresponding coefficient estimates will be positive. As economic 
opportunity is a prime motivation to migrate, we include the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
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U.S. to country i real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita values  in our 
estimation equations.
17
 All else constant, a higher ratio – that is, a higher level of average 
income in the U.S. as compared to a given migrant’s source country – is expected to increase 
migration flows and inflow shares. As a measure of mass, we include the natural logarithm of 
the population of country I . Our expectation is that, all else constant, a larger 
population in country i corresponds with a greater number of potential immigrants to the 
U.S.; thus, the corresponding coefficient estimate is expected to be positive. As greater 
distance, (again) all else held constant, corresponds with higher travel costs, to represent the 
direct costs of migration, we include the geodesic distance between country i and the United 
States. Accordingly, we anticipate a negative estimated coefficient for this variable. Finally, 
we include two dummy variables. The first dummy variable, COMLANGij, is equal to one if 
English is commonly spoken in country i and is equal to zero otherwise. As sharing a 
common language would signal, all else constant, a greater ease of assimilation and, thus, 
lower indirect costs of migration, we expected the corresponding coefficient estimate to be 
positive. The second dummy variable, CONTIGij, is equal to one if the U.S. and country i 
share a common border (i.e., if country i is Canada or Mexico) and is equal to zero otherwise. 
As a common border potentially reduces the direct cost of migration, we anticipate a positive 
coefficient estimate for this variable. Lastly, ijt is an assumed independent and identically 
distributed error term. 
The data source for both of our dependent variable series is the U.N. (2015) and the U.S. 
Census Bureau (1982, 1976, and 1975). The real GDP per capita series and the population 
series are from Maddison (2015). The geodesic distance between the capital city of country i 
and Washington, D.C. and English language use are from the CEPII (2015).  
We estimate equations (1) and (2) both with and without time (i.e., year) and source 
country fixed effects terms. Due to panel-level heteroscedasticity and first-order serial 
correlation, we employ the feasible generalized least squares estimation technique. We 
perform Chow (1960) tests to consider structural breaks in our dependent variable series at 
four points during our reference period: a) enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), b) 
enactment of the Emergency Quota Act (1921), c) enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act 
(1952), and d) enactment of the Hart-Celler Act (1968). This is done by truncating the data 
series to include the years prior to and following each suspected/known break; however, we 
avoid including more than one break in any estimation. For example, when testing for a 
structural break due to the enactment of the McCarren-Walter Act, we examine the period 
from 1922 (i.e., the year following enactment of the Emergency Quota Act) through 1968 
(i.e., the year that the Hart-Celler Act was enacted).  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Column (a) presents mean values and 
standard deviations for each of the variables over the full 1820-2009 reference period. During 
the typical year in our reference period, 3,275 immigrants arrived in the U.S. from the typical 
source country. U.S. real GDP per capita was nearly eight times the level in the average 
source country. About one out of seven source countries commonly use English, and the 
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average source country is located 8,624 miles from the U.S. Values presented in columns (b) 
through (f) correspond with the time periods prior to and following each of the potential 
breaks in our dependent variable series. T-tests comparing the mean values for each time 
period with the corresponding mean value from the full reference period indicate numerous 
significant changes across the abbreviated time periods. Focusing on the immigrant inflow 
variable, we see that the mean value is significantly lower than that of the full period during 
each abbreviated period except 1883-1921. Finally, values presented in columns (1)-(4) are 
test statistics calculated from t-tests of differences in mean values across abbreviated periods. 
For example, the average immigrant inflow increased significantly from the 1820-1882 period 
to the 1883-1921 period before decreasing significantly during the 1922-1952 period.  
 
Determinants of Immigrant Inflows and Inflow Shares 
 
Results obtained from the estimation of equation (1) and of equation (2) are presented in 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3, respectively. Beginning with Panel A, where the dependent 
variable series is the immigrant inflow, the four columns ((a) through (d)) present results from 
the estimation of our regression models with and without time and country fixed effect terms. 
Consistently, we find that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and 
significantly different from zero. As the specification is double-log, we can interpret the 
coefficients of our continuous explanatory variables as elasticities; thus, all else constant, a 
one percent increase in the lagged immigrant inflow increases the inflow during the current 
period by 0.93 to 0.98 percent. The coefficients of the ratio of real GDP per capita variable 
are positive in three of the four estimations and are statistically significant from zero and 
positive, as expected, in column (a) and in column (d). As anticipated, the estimated 
coefficients of the country i population variable are positive and significantly different from 
zero in all four estimations. Also as expected, the coefficients of the geodesic distance 
variable are negative and significantly different from zero and the coefficients of the common 
language and shared border dummy variables are positive and significantly different from 
zero. Since geodesic distance, shared border, and common language are time-invariant and 
country-specific, the variables are excluded from the estimations when country fixed effect 
terms are included.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Results presented in Panel B correspond to the estimation of equation (2). Here, the 
dependent variable series is the immigrant inflow share. We find a similar pattern of 
coefficient signs, and statistical significance from zero as reported in Panel A of the table. In 
all estimations, more than 90 percent of the variation in the dependent variable series is 
explained by the explanatory variables. Thus, the gravity model of migration appears to 
perform quite well.  
 
Potential Breaks in the Dependent Variable Series 
 
When testing for breaks in the dependent variable series, we estimate equations (1) and 
(2) without time or country fixed effects and then perform Chow tests. This is done for the 
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full sample, for traditional source countries (i.e., Europe, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) and for non-traditional source countries (i.e., all other countries in the data set). We 
also perform the estimations and Chow tests for regions (i.e., Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean), sub-regions (e.g., Western Asia, Southern Europe, and Middle 
Africa), and countries (i.e., Canada, China, and Mexico). Given the volume of estimations, it 
is impractical to present the complete set of results here.
18
 As an alternative, we present the 
Chow test statistics in Table 4. 
 
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
 
Focusing first on the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), the values 
presented in column (a) indicate a significant break in the immigrant inflow from China that 
coincides with the enactment of the Act (p < 0.01). Looking to the data file, we see that the 
immigrant inflow value for China declines sharply beginning in 1882 and remains 
persistently low through the first half of the 20th century. When stratifying the sample to test 
for breaks in the series for Asia and its sub-regions, we find significant breaks in the series for 
Eastern Asia (which includes China), Southern Asia, and Western Asia. A significant break 
also occurs for the full data sample at this point in time; however, we do not find evidence of 
a break in the series for the traditional cohort of source countries or for the non-traditional 
cohort. Likewise, we find there are significant breaks at this point in time for the Latin 
America and the Caribbean region, the Central America sub-region, and for Mexico. 
Similarly, we find evidence of significant breaks for the Western Europe sub-region and for 
Canada. Looking to column (e), we find a similar pattern of significant breaks in the 
immigrant share series. The only differences are that significant breaks are found for the 
immigrant share series of Southern Europe and for the cohort of non-traditional source 
countries, while no significant break is found for the full sample.   
Comparing the mean values for immigrant inflows across the 1820-1882 and 1883-1921 
periods, we find that, of the cohorts for which a significant break in the series is found, all 
mean values increase with the exceptions of those for China and Western Europe. Similarly, 
when comparing mean values for the immigrant inflow series across the two time periods, we 
find that the mean values of all cohorts for which significant breaks are identified in column 
(e) increase over time with the exceptions of China and Western Europe. Thus, we can say 
that during a period of general increase in immigrant inflows, marked decreases are seen for 
migration from Western European countries and from China, which was subject to a ban on 
migration to the U.S.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 
 
Turning our attention to the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, we repeat our process of 
testing for structural breaks in the dependent variable series across time periods. Here, we 
consider the 1883-1921 period relative to the 1922-1952 period. The Chow test statistics for 
the estimations where the immigrant inflow and inflow share series are employed as the 
                                                          
18
 The full set of results is available on request from the authors. 
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dependent variable series are presented in columns (b) and (f), respectively, of Table 4. Our 
expectation, given the restrictions imposed on immigrant inflows by the Emergency Quota 
Act, is that a significant decline in immigrant arrivals should be observed in all locales 
except, perhaps, the western hemisphere. The reason for this is simply that inflows from the 
countries in the western hemisphere were not subject to quotas. Among the regions, sub-
regions, and countries identified in column (b) as having significant breaks in the immigrant 
inflow series, it is only Canada and Mexico where mean values for the immigrant inflow 
series are higher during the 1922-1952 period than during the 1883-1921 period. All other 
locales for which a significant break is identified experienced decreases in the mean values of 
the immigrant inflow series.  
Testing for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow share series at the enactment of the 
Emergency Quota Act produces a mixed set of results. First, we see significant breaks for the 
full sample (i.e., “All countries”), for both the traditional source countries cohort and the non-
traditional source countries cohort, for two of four regions (i.e., Latin America and the 
Caribbean and Asia), for seven of 13 sub-regions (i.e., Australia and New Zealand, Northern 
Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe, East Asia, Southern Asia, and Western Asia), and 
two of the three countries considered (i.e., Canada and Mexico).  
The fact that a significant break is detected for so many of the cohorts indicates a 
considerable change in immigrant inflow shares at this point in time. Further, of the 14 
cohorts for which significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series are detected, nine 
experienced increases in the corresponding mean values across the time periods, while mean 
values decreased for five cohorts (i.e., Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Asia, East Asia, 
and West Asia). As with the immigrant inflow series, we find increases in mean values for 
Canada and Mexico, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean – all locales that were not 
subject to quotas. We also see an increase in the mean value of the inflow series for Western 
Europe and the traditional source countries cohort, which is comprised largely of European 
countries. This makes sense as countries in Northern and Western Europe were allocated 85 
percent of the total quota.  
   
The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 
 
As we test our third possible structural break, this time due to the enactment of the 
McCarren-Walter Act in 1952, our expectations shift. The McCarren-Walter Act was the first 
major legislative change in the process of U.S. immigration policy becoming less restrictive 
and less biased against migration from locations outside Northern and Western Europe. 
Accordingly, we expect that both immigrant inflow levels and inflow shares will increase 
significantly for the non-traditional source countries and regions while decreasing for the 
traditional source countries.  
Column (c) of Table 4 presents the F statistics from our Chow tests for structural breaks 
in the immigrant inflow series. As with the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, here we find a 
large number of structural breaks. Specifically, the full sample (i.e., “All countries”) cohort, 
the traditional source countries cohort, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Western Asia all have 
significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and lower mean values during the 1953-
1968 period as compared to the 1922-1952 period. In stark contrast, significant breaks are 
detected for the non-traditional source country cohort, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Central America, East Asia, and Southern Asia; however, for each the mean 
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values of the immigrant inflow series during the 1953-1968 period are greater than the 
corresponding values for the 1922-1952 period.  
The results of the Chow tests for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow share series 
are presented in column (g) of Table 4. Structural breaks in the inflow share series are found 
for all eleven of the groups for which structural breaks are reported in column (c). 
Additionally, breaks are found for three additional sub-regions (i.e., Northern Europe, 
Western Europe, and South-Eastern Asia) and for Mexico. The pattern of increased/decreased 
mean values across the two time periods is striking. Mean values of the immigrant inflow 
share series increased for eight of the 15 cohorts. Seven of these eight cohorts are in Asia or 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The seven groups for which decreases in mean values are 
found include Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the cohort of traditional source 
countries, and the full sample. The results suggest that, coinciding with the enactment of 
McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, a shift in immigrant inflows from the more traditional source 
countries and regions to countries in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean occurred.  
 
The Hart-Celler Act of 1965  
 
The pattern of detected structural breaks in the immigrant inflow series and in the 
immigrant inflow share series that correspond with the enactment of the McCarren-Walter 
Act provide but a glimpse of considerably more pronounced shift in U.S. immigration that 
coincides with the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act. First, when considering the immigrant 
inflow series, we find structural breaks in 24 of 28 cases. The Chow test statistics are 
presented in column (d) of Table 4. Second, when considering the immigrant inflow share 
series, breaks are found in 20 of 28 cases. The corresponding results are provided in column 
(h).  
Beginning with the immigrant inflow series, of the 24 detected breaks only five breaks 
correspond with decreases in mean values for the inflow series when the 1953-1968 period is 
compared to the 1969-2009 period. These five instances involve the traditional source country 
cohort, Canada, Europe, Northern Europe, and Western Europe – the very regions that were 
afforded preferential treatment for decades leading-up to passage of the Hart-Celler Act. The 
19 cases where the mean values of the immigrant inflow series increased from the 1953-1968 
period to the 1969-2009 period include the full sample, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and 
more significantly, the non-traditional source country cohort, the regions of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and Africa, as well as all of their sub-regions, Asia, South-Eastern Asia, 
Southern Asia, Western Asia, and China. It is striking how the identified structural breaks 
correspond with the changes in U.S. immigration policy that were implemented by the Hart-
Celler Act. 
Looking to column (g) and the immigrant inflow share series reveals similar and, to some 
degree, a clear and pronounced shift in the composition of immigrant inflows. Of the 20 
detected structural breaks in the immigrant inflow share series, there are eight cohorts for 
which the mean value in the series declined from the 1953-1968 period to the 1969-2009 
period. These eight cohorts include the full sample cohort, the traditional source country 
cohort, Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand, and Canada. The dozen cohorts for which the mean value of the immigrant inflow 
share series increased over the two time periods include the non-traditional source country 
cohort, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as its sub-regions, Asia, South-Eastern Asia, 
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Southern Asia, Western Asia, Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, and Western Africa. 
The pattern of change is quite remarkable even as it is consistent with the changes in 
immigration policy brought by the Hart-Celler Act.   
 
Summary 
 
We have considered four potential structural breakpoints in our dependent variable series 
and have found patterns of structural breaks and changes (i.e., increases or decreases) in 
corresponding mean values over time that are consistent with the hypothesis that shifts in 
U.S. immigration policy have had pronounced effects on both the level of immigrant arrivals 
to the U.S. and the composition of immigrant arrivals in terms of their source countries and 
regions. Given the demographic composition of the U.S. at the time of the 1790 Census and 
the corresponding preferences embodied in U.S. immigration policy, it is not at all surprising 
to find that in the late 1960s/early 1970s (based on Hofstede’s initial four dimensions) the 
U.S. was more similar, culturally, to the cohort of traditional source countries as compared to 
the non-traditional source country cohort. In short, the U.S. evolved to be culturally more 
similar to Northen and Western Europe, etc. as its culture has been shaped by its immigration 
policy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have recounted the history of immigration to the United States and have examined 
the corresponding legislative history and data on immigrant inflows for the period from 1820-
2013. Additionally, we have presented a descriptive analysis of cultural differences between 
the U.S. and several cohorts of countries and have sought to determine whether U.S. 
immigration policy and related immigrant inflow levels and the composition of immigrant 
inflows by country and/or region have had pronounced influences on the culture of the United 
States. Lastly, we have presented the findings of an economteric analysis of immigrant 
inflows and the results of a series of tests for structural breaks in the level of immigrant 
inflows and in the composition of the inflow series that correspond with key legislative/policy 
changes.  
Our analysis has found a consistent bias in U.S. immigration policy, until 1968, that 
favored immigration from Europe and, specifically, from countries in Northern and Western 
Europe. This bias influenced the level and composition of immigrant arrivals. In addition, the 
immigrant arrivals, being disproportionately from Europe for a large portion of American 
history (i.e., from the Colonial Era through the 1960s), have influenced the culture of the 
United States such that it is more culturally-similar to the cultures of Europe (particularly 
Northern and Western European countries), Canada, Australia and New Zealand than it is to 
the cultures of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, we can assert that 
U.S. immigration policy has shaped the society’s culture. However, following the enactment 
of the Hart-Celler Act in 1968 a shift occurred in the primary source countries and regions of 
U.S. immigrant arrivals. While previously inflows were typically dominated by Europeans, 
ore recent immigrant arrivals are more often from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
Basin, and Africa. This shift in primary source regions may have caused the culture of the 
United States to become more similar to the cultures of the recent immigrant arrivals’ source 
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countries and less similar from the more traditional source countries. Our econometric 
analysis produces results that are in support of these findings. We provide clear evidence that 
significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and in the immigrant inflow share series 
correspond with key pieces of legislation that have governed U.S. immigration policy.  
 
APPENDIX A: HOFSTEDE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS  
 
Country P
D
I 
ID
V
 
M
A
S
 
U
A
I 
Country P
D
I 
ID
V
 
M
A
S
 
U
A
I 
Albania
SE
 90 20 80 70 Latvia
NE,*
 44 70 9 63 
Angola 83 18 20 60 Lebanon 75 40 65 50 
Argentina 49 46 56 86 Libya 80 38 52 68 
Australia 36 90 61 51 Lithuania
NE,*
 42 60 19 65 
Austria
WE
 11 55 79 70 Luxembourg
WE
 40 60 50 70 
Bangladesh 80 20 55 60 Malawi 70 30 40 50 
Belgium
WE
 65 75 54 94 Malaysia 100 26 50 36 
Bhutan 94 52 32 28 Malta
SE
 56 59 47 96 
Brazil 69 38 49 76 Mexico 81 30 69 82 
Bulgaria
EE
 70 30 40 85 Morocco 70 46 53 68 
Burkina Faso 70 15 50 55 Mozambique 85 15 38 44 
Canada 39 80 52 48 Namibia 65 30 40 45 
Cape Verde 75 20 15 40 Nepal 65 30 40 40 
Chile  63 23 28 86 Netherlands
WE
 38 80 14 53 
China 80 20 66 30 New Zealand 22 79 58 49 
Colombia 67 13 64 80 Nigeria 80 30 60 55 
Costa Rica 35 15 21 86 Norway
NE
 31 69 8 50 
Croatia
SE
 73 33 40 80 Pakistan 55 14 50 70 
Czech Rep.
EE
 57 58 57 74 Panama 95 11 44 86 
Denmark
NE
 18 74 16 23 Peru 64 16 42 87 
Dominican Rep. 65 30 65 45 Philippines 94 32 64 44 
Ecuador 78 8 63 67 Poland
EE
 68 60 64 93 
Egypt 70 25 45 80 Portugal
SE
 63 27 31 99 
El Savaldor 66 19 40 94 Romania
EE
 90 30 42 90 
Estonia
NE,*
 40 60 30 60 Russia
EE,* 
 93 39 36 95 
Ethiopia 70 20 65 55 Saudi Arabia 95 25 60 80 
Fiji 78 14 46 48 Senegal 70 25 45 55 
Finland
NE
 33 63 26 59 Serbia
SE
 86 25 43 92 
France
WE
 68 71 43 86 Sierra Leone 70 20 40 50 
Germany
WE
 35 67 66 65 Singapore 74 20 48 8 
Ghana 80 15 40 65 Slovakia
EE
 100 52 100 51 
Greece
SE
 60 35 57 100 Slovenia
SE
 71 27 19 88 
Guatemala 95 6 37 99 South Africa 49 5 3 49 
Honduras 80 20 40 50 Spain
SE
 57 51 42 86 
Hong Kong 68 25 57 9 Sri Lanka 80 35 10 45 
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Hungary
EE
 46 80 88 82 Suriname 85 47 37 92 
Iceland
NE
 30 60 10 50 Sweden
NE
 31 71 5 29 
India 77 48 56 40 Switzerland
WE
 34 68 70 58 
Indonesia 78 14 46 48 Syria 80 35 52 60 
Iran 58 41 43 59 Taiwan 58 17 45 69 
Iraq 95 30 70 85 Tanzania 70 25 40 50 
Ireland
NE
 28 70 68 35 Thailand 64 20 34 64 
Israel 13 54 47 81 Trinidad and Tobago 47 16 58 55 
Italy
SE
 50 76 70 75 Turkey 66 37 45 85 
Jamaica 45 39 68 13 UAE 90 25 50 80 
Japan 54 46 95 92 UK
NE
 35 89 66 35 
Jordan 70 30 45 65 USA 40 91 62 46 
Kenya 70 25 60 50 Uruguay 61 36 38 99 
Korea, Rep. of 60 18 39 85 Venezuela 81 12 73 76 
Kuwait 90 25 40 80 Vietnam 70 20 40 30 
     Zambia 60 35 40 50 
Source: http://geert-hofstede.com/.  
Note: Variances for the PDI, IDV, MAS, and UAI series are equal to 429.84, 486.14, 344.30, 
and 454.67, respectively. 
 
APPENDIX B: GLOBE PROJECT CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
 
  A
S
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G
L
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S
T
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IN
G
P
-C
O
L
 
P
O
W
D
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T
 
U
N
C
-A
V
D
 
Albania
SE
 4.57 3.48 4.28 5.51 4.44 4.45 
Argentina 4.18 3.44 3.66 5.51 5.56 3.63 
Australia 4.29 3.41 4.31 4.14 4.81 4.40 
Austria
WE
  4.59 3.18 4.34 4.89 5.00 5.10 
Brazil 4.25 3.44 3.94 5.16 5.24 3.74 
Canada 4.09 3.66 4.36 4.22 4.85 4.54 
China  3.77 3.03 4.67 5.86 5.02 4.81 
Colombia 4.16 3.64 3.84 5.59 5.37 3.62 
Costa Rica 3.83 3.56 3.95 5.26 4.70 3.84 
Denmark
NE
  4.04 4.02 4.93 3.63 4.14 5.32 
Ecuador 3.98 3.09 3.82 5.55 5.29 3.63 
Egypt 3.91 2.90 4.36 5.49 4.76 3.97 
El Salvador 4.49 3.23 3.74 5.22 5.56 3.69 
Finland
NE
  4.05 3.55 4.77 4.23 5.08 5.11 
France
WE
  4.44 3.81 4.20 4.66 5.68 4.66 
Germany
WE
 4.77 3.17 3.67 4.59 5.70 5.19 
Greece
SE
 4.55 3.53 3.41 5.28 5.35 3.52 
Guatemala 3.96 3.14 3.78 5.54 5.47 3.44 
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Hong Kong 4.53 3.26 4.03 5.33 4.94 4.17 
Hungary
EE
  4.71 4.02 3.63 5.31 5.57 3.26 
India 3.70 2.89 4.25 5.81 5.29 4.02 
Indonesia 3.70 3.04 4.27 5.50 4.93 3.92 
Ireland
NE
  3.93 3.19 4.57 5.12 5.13 4.25 
Israel 4.19 3.21 4.40 4.63 4.71 3.97 
Italy
SE
  4.12 3.30 3.75 4.99 5.45 3.85 
Japan 3.69 3.17 5.23 4.72 5.23 4.07 
Korea, Rep. of 4.36 2.45 5.20 5.71 5.69 3.52 
Kuwait 3.56 2.59 4.32 5.70 4.97 4.02 
Malaysia 3.77 3.31 4.45 5.47 5.09 4.59 
Mexico 4.31 3.50 3.95 5.62 5.07 4.06 
Morocco  4.72 3.08 4.18 6.37 6.14 3.95 
Namibia 3.81 3.69 4.02 4.39 5.29 4.09 
Netherlands
WE
 4.46 3.62 4.62 3.79 4.32 4.81 
New Zealand 3.47 3.18 4.96 3.58 5.12 4.86 
Nigeria 4.53 3.04 4.00 5.34 5.32 4.14 
Philippines 3.85 3.42 4.37 6.14 5.15 3.69 
Poland
EE
  4.11 3.94 4.51 5.55 5.09 3.71 
Portugal
SE
  3.75 3.69 4.02 5.64 5.50 3.96 
Russia
EE,*
  3.86 4.07 4.57 5.83 5.61 3.09 
Singapore 4.06 3.52 4.77 5.66 4.92 5.16 
Slovenia
SE
 4.01 3.84 4.09 5.49 5.32 3.76 
Spain
SE
  4.39 3.06 3.87 5.53 5.53 3.95 
Sweden
NE
 3.41 3.72 5.26 3.46 4.94 5.36 
Switzerland
WE
  4.58 3.12 4.20 4.04 5.05 5.42 
Taiwan 3.70 2.92 4.30 5.45 5.00 4.04 
Thailand 3.58 3.26 3.88 5.72 5.62 3.79 
Turkey 4.42 3.02 4.02 5.79 5.43 3.67 
UK
NE
 4.23 3.67 4.31 4.08 5.26 4.70 
USA 4.50 3.36 4.21 4.22 4.92 4.15 
Venezuela 4.25 3.60 3.96 5.41 5.22 3.55 
Zambia 4.00 2.88 4.41 5.72 5.23 3.92 
 
APPENDIX C: COUNTRY LISTING, BY REGION AND SUB-REGION  
 
Africa  
Eastern Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Réunion, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe; 
Middle Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe; 
Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia; 
Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland; 
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Western Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo; 
 
Asia 
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; 
Eastern Asia: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, DPR, Korea, Rep. of, Mongolia, Taiwan; 
South-Eastern Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Viet Nam; 
Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; 
Western Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; 
 
Europe 
Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine; 
Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Sweden, UK; 
Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain; 
Western Europe: Austria; Belgium; France; Germany; Netherlands; Switzerland; 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Caribbean: Dominican Rep., Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago;  
Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama;  
South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela; 
 
Northern America 
Northern America: Canada; and 
 
Oceania  
Australia and New Zealand 
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Table 1: Immigrant Inflows, by Region, Sub-region, and Country, 1820-2013
1820-1881 1882-1920 1921-1951 1952-1967 1968-2013 1820-2013
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Total Immigrant Arrivals 9,985,008 22,986,644 6,305,238 4,432,522 34,667,604 78,377,017
Africa 1,006 16,370 16,896 27,422 1,862,246 1,923,940
     Eastern Africa 0 0 0 0 545,899 545,899
     Middle Africa 0 0 0 0 86,064 86,064
     Northern Africa 0 0 0 0 376,406 376,406
     Southern Africa 0 0 0 0 84,602 84,602
     Western Africa 0 0 0 0 680,115 680,115
     Other Africa 0 0 0 0 89,160 89,160
Asia 230,050 640,505 335,041 806,109 12,276,079 14,287,784
     Central Asia 0 22,117 35,646 160,438 134,507 352,708
     Eastern Asia 229,280 348,477 101,005 123,277 3,468,563 4,270,602
          China 228,945 11,890 128 22,402 1,385,282 1,648,647
     South-Eastern Asia 0 0 8,447 47,599 3,057,152 3,113,198
     Southern Asia 359 6,832 4,552 10,888 4,385,421 4,408,052
     Western Asia 69 180,768 24,747 3,322 1,125,711 1,334,617
     Other Asia 342 82,311 160,644 460,585 104,723 808,605
Europe 8,989,887 20,562,400 3,843,685 1,954,691 4,217,499 39,568,163
     Central Europe 80,769 27,935 0 0 56,104 164,808
     Eastern Europe 60,473 7,627,675 758,383 203,604 1,237,640 9,887,775
     Northern Europe 5,666,146 5,800,125 1,340,054 713,167 1,224,622 14,744,114
     Southern Europe 130,376 4,664,099 903,655 494,716 1,114,005 7,306,851
     Western Europe 3,052,126 2,442,564 841,594 543,204 585,127 7,464,615
Latin America and the Caribbean 98,555 498,563 760,545 949,081 15,442,109 17,748,854
     Caribbean 63,490 279,272 159,836 336,771 4,385,651 5,225,020
     Central America 25,119 219,169 600,709 612,310 8,598,663 10,055,970
          Mexico 25,119 219,169 600,709 612,310 6,758,311 8,215,618
     Other Americas 9,946 122 0 0 39,483 49,551
     South America 0 0 0 0 2,418,312 2,418,312
Northern America 654,660 1,228,001 1,320,665 667,513 681,836 4,552,675
          Canada 654,660 1,228,001 1,320,650 667,507 673,770 4,544,588
Oceania 9,822 32,014 26,891 23,233 185,315 277,275
     Australia and New Zealand 9,822 32,014 26,891 23,233 115,898 207,858
     Melanesia 0 0 0 0 41,979 41,979
     Micronesia 0 0 0 0 1,339 1,339
     Polynesia 0 0 0 0 26,099 26,099
Pacific Islands 1,028 8,791 1,515 4,473 2,520 18,327
Figure 1: Immigrant Inflow Shares and U.S. Federal Immigration Policy, 1820-2013
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Period: 1820-2009 1820-1882 (b) v. (c) 1883-1921 (c) v. (d) 1922-1952 (d) v. (e) 1953-1968 (e) v. (f) 1969-2009
Variable (a) (b) (1) (c) (2) (d) (3) (e) (4) (f)
Inflowijt 3,274.59 2,533.45** 3.55### 4,457.50** -5.44### 1,668.27*** -1.54 1,286.56*** 5.27### 2,501.62***
(16,996.65) (15,169.28) (22,111.16) (9,697.05) (6,249.30) (14,746.03)
Inflowijt-1 3,212.69 3,062.94 2.43## 4,467.79** -5.05### 1,813.90*** -1.95# 1,284.33*** 5.14### 2,484.85***
(16,918.22) (18,735.89) (22,263.20) (10,873.78) (6,500.05) (14,730.45)
Inflow Shareijt 0.9843 1.5371*** -1.87# 1.2133* 0.26 1.2573** -3.72### 0.7269*** 4.67### 1.2164***
(4.7046) (7.2084) (5.4530) (5.6554) (3.4946) (5.7835)
Inflow Shareijt-1 0.9837 1.5325*** -1.86# 1.2097* 0.30 1.2592** -3.71### 0.7270*** 4.56### 1.2146***
(4.7215) (7.2225) (5.4481) (5.6121) (3.6254) (5.7967)
Relative GDP Per Capitaijt 7.9661 2.7925*** 26.35### 4.1998*** 16.16### 6.0230*** 17.92### 9.3689*** -23.96### 5.3279***
(9.8889) (1.3574) (2.2445) (4.7585) (7.3096) (5.0054)
Populationit 2.5E+07 1.5E+07*** 3.50### 2.1E+07*** 1.43 2.4E+07 -1.83# 2.0E+07*** 0.00 2.0E+07***
(8.9E+07) (5.7E+07) (6.5E+07) (7.4E+07) (7.0E+07) (6.6E+07)
Geodesic Distanceij 8,624.18 8,567.73 -0.56 8,511.62 -2.68### 8,220.19*** 5.25### 8,781.70** -2.99### 8,525.58*
(3,455.65) (3,611.31) (3,561.26) (3,645.74) (3,405.41) (3,566.49)
Common Borderij 0.0238 0.0401*** -0.99 0.0349*** -1.17 0.0287 -3.20### 0.0146*** 4.74### 0.0306***
(0.1526) (0.1962) (0.1836) (0.1669) (0.1200) (0.1722)
Common Languageij 0.1367 0.0886*** 1.96## 0.1048*** 0.80 0.1123*** 6.57### 0.1825*** -6.90### 0.1189***
(0.3435) (0.2842) (0.3064) (0.3159) (0.3863) (0.3237)
N 15,850 3,093 2,233 2,163 2,192 6,169
Standard deviations in parentheses. "***", "**", and "*" denote statistical significance from the corresponding mean value over the 1820-2009 period at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. Values presented in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) are t statistics from t tests of mean values in indicated columns. "###", "##", and "#" 
denote that the difference in mean values across indicated columns is statistically significat at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3: Determinants of Immigrant Inflows and Inflow Shares
Panel A: Dependent Variable: ln Inflow it
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ln Inflowijt-1 0.9796*** 0.9661*** 0.9513*** 0.9362***
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0028)
ln Relative GDP Per Capitaijt 0.0269*** -0.0088 0.0242 0.0766***
(0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0158) (0.0154)
ln Populationit 0.0313*** 0.035*** 0.1755*** 0.0842***
(0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0108) (0.015)
ln Geodesic Distanceij -0.0369*** -0.0368***
(0.0135) (0.0121)
Common Borderij 0.019 0.1143***
(0.045) (0.0407)
Common Languageij 0.0366** 0.0313**
(0.0173) (0.0155)
Constant -0.0876 -0.1676 -2.6637*** -1.4523***
(0.1272) (0.1459) (0.1879) (0.2506)
N 15,850 15,850 16,427 16,427
Pseudo R
2
0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97
Wald c
2
410,349*** 523,968*** 432,286*** 546,737***
Time FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Inflow Share it
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Inflow Shareijt-1 0.9463*** 0.9462*** 0.9244*** 0.9207***
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.003)
ln Relative GDP Per Capitaijt -0.0218* -0.0121 0.0095 0.0466
(0.0117) (0.013) (0.0293) (0.0321)
ln Populationit 0.0295*** 0.0322*** 0.0366** 0.1963***
(0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0162) (0.0318)
ln Geodesic Distanceij -0.045* -0.0503**
(0.0253) (0.0254)
Common Borderij 0.4061*** 0.3914***
(0.0852) (0.0854)
Common Languageij 0.0581* 0.0637*
(0.0325) (0.0326)
Constant 0.0148 -0.5144* -0.6197** -3.4886***
(0.2379) (0.3064) (0.2974) (0.5275)
N 15,850 15,850 16,427 16,427
Pseudo R
2
0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Wald c
2
178,772*** 179,646*** 187,716*** 188,979***
Time FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. "***", "**", and "*" denote statistical significance from
zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients of the time and country
fixed effect terms are not presented due to space limitations.
Table 4: Summary of Chow Test Statistics
Period Examined: 1820-1921 1883-1952 1922-1968 1953-2009 1820-1921 1883-1952 1922-1968 1953-2009
Possible Break at: 1882 1921 1952 1968 1882 1921 1952 1968
Region/Sub-region/Country (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
All Countries 17.21** . 77.44*** 308.61*** . 25.85*** 100.07*** 323.08***
"Traditional" Source Countries . . 15.08** 68.31*** . 14.75** 32.96*** 310.24***
   Australia and New Zealand . 15.83*** . . . 13.55*** . 13.45***
   Canada 25.05*** 7.96* . 23.17*** 18.83*** 17.26*** . 29.40***
   Europe . . 11.17* 63.96*** . . 37.94*** 91.61***
      Eastern Europe . . 16.76*** 10.31* . . 15.37*** .
      Northern Europe . 15.98** . 36.04*** . 20.68*** 15.23** 182.60***
      Southern Europe . . . 17.45*** 11.34** 33.12*** . 27.28***
      Western Europe 14.53** 9.29* . 76.52*** 24.55*** 12.21** 39.66*** 22.26***
"Non-Traditional" Source Countries . . 122.90*** 259.43*** 16.27** 86.92*** 380.63*** 110.92***
   Latin America and the Caribbean 62.84*** . 139.29*** 189.44*** . 27.07*** 149.40*** 36.29***
      Central America 12.45** 32.71*** 50.74*** 130.76*** . . 56.48*** .
         Mexico 20.23*** 8.11* . . 9.81** 34.00*** 38.56*** .
      Caribbean . . . 44.89*** . . . 9.24*
      South America . . . 106.78*** . . . 15.74***
   Asia 40.51*** 16.51** 53.19*** 73.14*** 30.39*** 19.53*** 221.80*** 22.51***
      Central Asia . . . . . . . .
      Eastern Asia 68.78*** 33.24*** 16.29*** . 25.83*** 17.28*** 32.14*** .
         China 32.41*** 12.11** . 27.83*** 20.07*** . . .
      South-Eastern Asia . . . 49.58*** . . 141.62*** 19.70***
      Southern Asia 27.61*** . 31.42*** 29.07*** 13.88** 14.21** 22.79*** 10.36*
      Western Asia 68.40*** 40.53*** 62.92*** 48.54*** 32.95*** 66.43*** 99.06*** 14.56**
   Africa . . . 93.61*** . . . 13.56**
      Eastern Africa . . . 23.22*** . . . .
      Middle Africa . . . 18.28*** . . . .
      Northern Africa . . . 24.03*** . . . 16.93***
      Southern Africa . . . 19.82*** . . . 17.16***
      Western Africa . . . 29.01*** . . . 9.32*
"***", "**", and "*" denote significance from zero (i.e., the presence of a break in the data) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. "." indicates 
p-value > 0.1.
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